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M
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
   aritime exclusion zones have been described as “one of the most con-
troversial issues in the law of armed conflict at sea” and as an issue “that 
remains unresolved.”1 Part of the reason for the controversy relates to the 
potential infringement on the freedom of the high seas which, since the time 
of Grotius, has been seen as open to all States.2 Another part of the explana-
tion relates to the lack of consistent State practice and the diversity of States’ 
views on the subject of exclusion zones. State parties to armed conflicts in 
which exclusion zones were utilized took the view that they were justified, 
either for an exceptional reason, for example, as a belligerent reprisal, or due 
to a rule of law that authorized them. The justifications thus varied consid-
erably, with significant consequences for when exclusion zones could be 
used. By contrast, States that were not parties to the armed conflicts criti-
cized them, sometimes as unlawful for interfering with the freedom of the 
high seas, or remained silent on their legality.3 This difference of opinion 
extended to commentators. Whereas some commentators observed in no 
uncertain terms that exclusion zones were unlawful, others expressed the 
view, in equally clear terms, that exclusion zones were lawful.4 The uncer-
tainty was not helped by different terms being used to describe the same 
practice, such as “war zones,” “exclusion zones” and “barred areas,”5 and by 
                                                                                                                      
1. Christopher Michaelsen, Maritime Exclusion Zones in Times of Armed Conflict at Sea: Le-
gal Controversies Still Unresolved, 8 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 363, 364 (2003). 
2. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BE-
LONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 28 (James Brown 
Scott ed., Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1608); Conven-
tion on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [herein-
after UNCLOS].  
3. See Part III. 
4. Compare, for example, the views of GEORGE POLITAKIS, MODERN ASPECTS OF THE 
LAWS OF NAVAL WARFARE AND MARITIME NEUTRALITY (1998) with W.T. MALLISON JR., 
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIMITED 
WARS 74 (1968) (Vol. 58, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
5. The term “exclusion zone” will be used in the present article, unless a different 
term is used by a party to an armed conflict, such as the term “war zone” in the Iran–Iraq 
armed conflict. See infra Part III.D.  
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certain similarities with associated concepts such as “defensive bubbles,” the 
“immediate area of operations,”6 and “blockades.”7  
This article traces the evolution in the law and practice of exclusion 
zones and argues that the zones have gone through three distinct phases. 
The first phase of the exclusion zone—and Part II of the present article—
corresponds to the use of exclusion zones in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904–5. In that war, exclusion zones were defensive in character, modest in 
size and located adjacent to the State that authorized their creation. Part III 
explores the second phase of their evolution, which saw them transformed 
into something rather different. During the First World War, and in a 
number of wars and armed conflicts that followed, if a vessel was within an 
exclusion zone, it was deemed susceptible to attack. This was true regard-
less of whether the vessel was a neutral or belligerent one. Exclusion zones 
of this period were also far larger in size than the exclusion zones of the 
Russo-Japanese War and were located, in certain instances, at quite some 
distance from the coast of the State that authorized them. The start of the 
third (and present) phase of exclusion zones, discussed in Part IV, can be 
traced to the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Con-
flicts at Sea, which was adopted in 1994.8 That Manual transformed the law 
and practice of exclusion zones. In particular, it separated out the estab-
lishment of the zone from the enforcement of the zone and specified that 
the same law applies within the zone as outside it. It also set out regulations 
for the zones should they be created. The San Remo Manual has had a con-
siderable effect on States’ views of exclusion zones, as is evident from the 
manuals of a number of States that have been published since the San Remo 
Manual. The San Remo Manual thus ushered in a third phase of exclusion 
zones, one that is fundamentally different from the phases that preceded it. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
6. The immediate area of operations is “that area within which hostilities are taking 
place or belligerent forces are actually operating.” In that area, “a belligerent may establish 
special restrictions upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may prohibit alto-
gether such vessels and aircraft from entering.” SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 183 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL].  
7. A blockade is “the blocking of the approach to the enemy coast, or a part of it, for 
the purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels or aircraft of all States.” Id. at 176. 
8. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6. 
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II. DEFENSE ZONES: THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
  
The first armed conflict in which an exclusion zone was established was the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. Shortly prior to the outbreak of that war, 
Japan issued an ordinance which read as follows: 
 
ART 1. In case of war or emergency, the minister of the navy may, 
limiting an area, designate a defence sea area under this ordinance. . . . 
ART. 3. In the defence sea area, the ingress and egress and passage of 
any vessels other than those belonging to the army or navy are prohibited 
from sunset to sunrise. 
ART. 4. Within the limits of naval and secondary naval ports includ-
ed in a defence sea area the ingress and egress and passage of all vessels 
other than those belonging to the army or navy are prohibited. 
ART. 5. All vessels which enter, leave, pass through, or anchor in a 
defence sea area shall obey the direction of the commander in chief of the 
naval station, or the commandant of the secondary naval station, con-
cerned. . . . . 
ART. 8. Any vessel which has transgressed this ordinance, or orders 
issued under this ordinance, may be ordered to leave the defense sea area 
by a route which shall be designated. 
Regarding vessels which do not obey the order mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph, armed force may be used when necessary. . . .9 
 
Pursuant to the ordinance, some twelve or so strategic areas were designat-
ed. These included, among other sites, “the bays at Tokio, the waters about 
the Pescadores Islands, those adjacent to the naval stations of Sazebo and 
Nagasaki, [and] the Tougaru straits.”10 In certain places, the strategic areas 
extended to some ten miles from the coast,11 beyond the three mile limit, 
which was, at the time, the maximum extent of the breadth of the territori-
al sea recognized in international law. In these places, then, the strategic 
area covered portions of the high seas. 
Japan thus sought to limit access to certain waters to vessels other than 
those of its navy. It did so by prohibiting the movement of other vessels 
                                                                                                                      
9. See Imperial Ordinance No. 11 (Jan. 23, 1904), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SITUATIONS WITH SOLUTIONS AND NOTES 1912, at 122 (1912) (Vol. 12, U.S. Naval War 
College International Law Studies), https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/f6af26bc-
a409-40d1-949c-498c3507e5f5/Vol--12---International-Law-Situations-with-Soluti.aspx 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1912]. 
10. 1 JAMES GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 351 n.2 (1920). 
11. Id. 
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between sunset and sunrise, and by prohibiting movement of such vessels 
at all times near its naval ports. Vessels that were permitted to move within 
the restricted areas were required to follow the instructions of the relevant 
commander. More detailed rules were issued governing the movement of 
vessels in the restricted areas.12 Vessels that did not follow the ordinance, 
or did not follow the more detailed rules, were required to leave the defen-
sive area along a particular route, a requirement which could be enforced 
by armed force.  
In at least one instance, a neutral vessel that was found in the restricted 
area was condemned as prize. A Japanese warship captured the Quang-nam, 
a steamship flying the flag of France, following its entry into the protected 
area around the Pescadores Islands. The Prize Court at Sasebo held:  
 
That she purposely chose the difficult passage between Formosa and the 
Pescadores on the pretence of going to Manila . . . was evidently for the 
purpose of reconnoitring the defences near these islands, and the move-
ments of the Japanese Squadron. . . . When a ship, though neutral, has 
taken part in reconnoitring the defences and the movements of a squad-
ron for the assistance of the enemy, as in this case, her condemnation is 
allowed by International Law.”13    
 
On appeal, the Higher Prize Court took a similar position.14 The presence 
of the vessel in the strategic area reportedly “seemed to be a circumstance 
that weighed against its release and an evidence of unneutral service.”15 No-
tably—and contrary to the practice during the second phase of exclusion 
zones—although the merchant vessel was found in the restricted area, it 
was not attacked; rather, it was captured and condemned as prize. 
The defense zones used by Japan did not meet with protest on the part 
of other States. Commentators also considered them lawful. A belligerent, 
it was said, 
 
                                                                                                                      
12. See, e.g., Rules governing the Strategic Area at Nagasaki, issued by the Commander 
in Chief of Sasebo, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1912, supra note 9, at 
125. 
13. See 2 RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE PRIZE CASES 343, 346 (Sir Cecil James Barrington 
Hurst & Francis Edmond Bray eds., 1913). 
14. Id. 
15. INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1912, supra note 9, at 128. But cf. POLITAKIS, 
supra note 4, at 39 n.8 (arguing that the case was one of “unneutral service rather than war 
zone running”). 
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is entitled to regulate the use of his territorial waters in such fashion as 
shall be necessary for his well-being. Similarly a belligerent may be 
obliged to assume in time of war for his own protection a measure of 
control over the waters which in time of peace would be outside of his ju-
risdiction.16 
 
This was considered to be “undoubtedly sanctioned by the customary 
law.”17 
The nature of the exclusion zone was transformed fundamentally in the 
practice of the international armed conflicts that followed the Russo-
Japanese War. Whereas exclusion zones during that war were defensive in 
their nature, those utilized in later armed conflicts, starting with the First 
World War, were tantamount to free-fire zones. Such is the difference be-
tween the two practices that the zones of the Russo-Japanese War are bare-
ly discussed in much of the literature on exclusion zones. Nonetheless, the 
Japanese zones are important as they are the precursor to the better known 
exclusion zones that were used during the First World War. 
 
III. FREE-FIRE ZONES: FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR TO THE IRAN-
IRAQ ARMED CONFLICT 
 
A. First World War 
 
During the First World War, Germany planted mines in the high seas and 
in the territorial waters of neutral States. Reports at the time suggested that 
mines were being laid by fishing vessels and by ships flying the flag of neu-
tral States.18 As a result, Great Britain instituted a number of measures, in-
cluding the laying of mines, the closure of ports on the eastern coast of 
England to neutral fishing vessels and the adoption of “‘special measures 
of control’ over the waters of the North Sea contiguous to the English 
coast.”19 Within certain designated zones, neutral fishing vessels were to be 
“treated as under suspicion of being engaged in mine laying for Germany 
                                                                                                                      
16. INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1912, supra note 9, at 128. 
17. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A TREATISE 
ON THE DYNAMICS OF DISPUTES AND WAR LAW 572 (1954). 
18. GARNER, supra note 10, at 329. See also COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE GREAT WAR 377 (1915). 
19. GARNER, supra note 10, at 329 n.1. Other States adopted similar measures. See 
POLITAKIS, supra note 4, at 42. 
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and, if caught in the act . . . sunk.”20 This led to a protest on the part of the 
Netherlands, which contested the measures adopted as “an encroachment 
upon the right of neutral fishermen to exercise in a peaceable manner their 
trade in the open seas.”21   
On November 3, 1914, Britain issued an admiralty notice, which re-
called the mining of the seas on the part of Germany and provided: 
 
Owing to the discovery of mines in the North Sea, the whole of that sea 
must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of 
all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be 
exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to 
lay and from war-ships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspi-
cious craft. 
All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned 
of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict ac-
cordance with Admiralty directions. . . . . 
 
Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, 
Denmark, and Holland are advised to come, if inwards bound, by the 
English Channel and Straits of Dover. There they will be given sailing di-
rections which will pass them safely. . . . . 
 
By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be 
able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, 
but any straying, even for a few miles, from the course thus indicated may 
be followed by serious consequences.22  
 
Over the months and years that followed, further minefields were laid, and 
the area extended.23  
For its part, on February 4, 1915, Germany issued a decree establishing 
an exclusion zone. After recalling the measures taken by Great Britain, the 
decree provided that Germany: 
 
                                                                                                                      
20. GARNER, supra note 10, at 329 n.1. 
21. Id.  
22. British Admiralty Notice No. 1706 (Nov. 3, 1914), reprinted in GARNER, supra note 
10, at 333. 
23. See Telegrams from Ambassador W.H. Page to the Secretary of State (Jan. 25 & 
Feb. 15, 1917), reprinted in 4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 
WITH BELLIGERENT GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO NEUTRAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES 47–
48 (1918). 
 
 
 
Exclusion Zones in the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea Vol. 92 
 
160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[T]herefore finds itself under the necessity, to its regret, of taking military 
measures against England in retaliation for the practice followed by Eng-
land. Just as England declared the whole North Sea between Scotland and 
Norway to be comprised within the seat of war, so does Germany now 
declare the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the 
whole English Channel, to be comprised within the seat of war, and will 
prevent by all the military means at its disposal all navigation by the ene-
my in those waters. To this end it will endeavor to destroy, after February 
18 next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at 
the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to 
avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise. Neutral 
powers are accordingly forewarned not to continue to entrust their crews, 
passengers, or merchandise to such vessels. Their attention is furthermore 
called to the fact that it is of urgency to recommend to their own vessels 
to steer clear of these waters. It is true that the German navy has received 
instructions to abstain from all violence against neutral vessels recogniza-
ble as such; but in view of the hazards of war, and of the misuse of the 
neutral flag ordered by the British government, it will not always be pos-
sible to prevent a neutral vessel from becoming the victim of an attack in-
tended to be directed against a vessel of the enemy.24 
 
Germany’s exclusion zone was extended and, by January 1917, included the 
waters around Great Britain, France, Italy and the eastern Mediterranean.25 
The notice informing of the extension of the zone came with the warning 
that “[a]ll ships met within that zone will be sunk.”26 Exceptionally, Ameri-
can merchant vessels were allowed safe passage along a designated route 
subject to very specific conditions.27 
Great Britain and Germany thus each effectively instituted zones cov-
ering large tracts of water which interfered with neutral shipping. There 
were, however, important differences both between the zones established 
by the two States, as well as between those zones and the zones established 
by Japan immediately prior to the Russo-Japanese War.  
                                                                                                                      
24. German Decree of February 4, 1915, reprinted in GARNER, supra note 10, at 335. 
25. GARNER, supra note 10, at 337. 
26. Message from the German Ambassador to the Secretary of State (Jan. 31, 1917), 
reprinted in NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 1943, at 55 (1945) 
(Vol. 43, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies), 
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a8dd9e0d-792b-4a10-a886-cbc5db4fb9a7/Vol--
44---International-Law-Documents--1943.aspx. 
27. See GARNER, supra note 10, at 337. 
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Britain heavily mined certain waters, but made provision for safe pas-
sage through the mined area, providing sailing directions to the masters of 
vessels. The laying of mines was regulated by Hague Convention (VIII) 
relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.28 Reported-
ly, no neutral vessels were destroyed or damaged as a result of the mines 
laid by Britain while navigating the area.29 Britain also did not engage in at-
tacks on neutral shipping.30 However, neutral vessels had to travel hun-
dreds of miles off-route in order to reach particular destinations. This inter-
fered with the freedom of the seas and with neutral shipping, and conse-
quently led to protest.31  
For its part, Germany’s exclusion zones not only interfered with the 
freedom of the seas for neutral shipping, but the decree establishing them 
indicated that Germany would “endeavor to destroy” enemy merchant ves-
sels that were found in the exclusion zone. Indeed, according to one ac-
count, in the first six months following the entry into force of the decree, 
seventy-eight British merchant vessels and eighty-two fishing craft were 
sunk.32 Furthermore, the decree went on to specify that neutral merchant 
vessels were susceptible to attack “in view of the hazards of war, and of the 
misuse of the neutral flag ordered by the British government.”33 Germany 
did not issue instructions to masters of vessels to enable safe passage along 
particular sea routes, and many neutral merchant vessels were indeed de-
stroyed.34  
Many of the sinkings were contrary to the international law rules of the 
time. The standard response to enemy merchant vessels was visit, search 
and seizure. Enemy merchant vessels could be sunk if they were taking a 
direct part in hostilities,35 or if they resisted visit “after having been duly 
signalled to do so.”36 Enemy merchant vessels sailing in convoy with enemy 
                                                                                                                      
28. Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact 
Mines, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541. 
29. GARNER, supra note 10, at 336. 
30. W.J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Warfare, 24 CANADIAN 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 96 (1986). 
31. See infra, pp. 162–64. 
32. J.W. Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War (VII): War Zones 
and Submarine Warfare, 9 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 594, 606 (1915). 
33. German Decree of Feb. 4, 1915, supra note 24. 
34. See Garner, supra note 32, at 609–11. 
35. W. J. Fenrick, Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval Warfare, 29 CANADIAN 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238, 244 (1991). 
36. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 226 (1912). 
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warships were deemed to be resisting.37 In limited—and disputed—
circumstances, a captured enemy merchant vessel could also be sunk.38 
Neutral merchant vessels also benefitted from significant protection. The 
general remedy for the carriage of contraband was condemnation of the 
goods and/or the vessel.39 Likewise, the remedy for unneutral service was 
condemnation of the vessel.40 Accordingly, the vessel had to be taken into 
port to determine the legality of the capture. Captured neutral vessels could 
be sunk only in limited—and again disputed—circumstances and only if all 
persons on board were placed in safety and all the ship’s papers and certain 
documents were taken on board the warship.41 Neutral merchant vessels 
were subject to the same treatment as that afforded to enemy merchant 
vessels in certain circumstances, namely, where the vessel was taking a di-
rect part in the hostilities, if the vessel was “under the orders or control of 
an agent placed on board by the enemy Government,” if it was “in the ex-
clusive employment of the enemy Government,” or if it was “exclusively 
engaged at the time either in the transport of enemy troops or in the 
transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy.”42 Accordingly, 
although it was disputed as to precisely in which situations merchant ves-
sels could be attacked, even the broadest approach considered attacks au-
thorized only in limited situations. Thus, the standard response remained 
visit, search and seizure.  
The British and German measures met with protests. Following the is-
suance of the British admiralty notice, the Netherlands criticized the laying 
of mines and, on the issue of the exclusion zone, expressed the view that: 
 
[A]ccording to the law of nations, the immediate sphere of military action 
alone constitutes a “military zone” in which the right of belligerent police 
may be exercised. A body of water of the area of the North Sea could not 
be considered in its whole extent as such a sphere of operations. In thus 
treating this region as a military zone, the British government was com-
                                                                                                                      
37. Fenrick, supra note 35, at 244. 
38. See J.W. Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War (IX): Destruc-
tion of Neutral Merchant Vessels, 10 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 
(1916); HANS WEHBERG, CAPTURE IN WAR ON LAND AND SEA ch. VII (1911).  
39. Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War arts. 39, 40 (Feb. 26, 1909), 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/255?OpenDocument. The Declaration did not enter 
into force. 
40. Id., art. 45. 
41. See id., arts. 48–51.  
42. See id., art. 46.  
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mitting a grave infraction upon the freedom of the seas, a principle rec-
ognized by all nations.43  
 
The United States likewise expressed disquiet. The Secretary of State wrote 
to the British Ambassador: 
 
As the question of appropriating certain portions of the high seas for mil-
itary operations, to the exclusion of the use of the hostile area as a com-
mon highway of commerce, has not become a settled principle of interna-
tional law assented to by the family of nations, it will be recognized that 
the Government of the United States must, and hereby does, for the pro-
tection of American interests, reserve generally all of its rights in the 
premises, including the right not only to question the validity of these 
measures, but to present demands and claims in relation to any American 
interests which may be unlawfully affected, directly or indirectly, by virtue 
of the enforcement of these measures.44 
 
Likewise, Garner considered the proclamation of the military area to be “a 
serious infringement upon the principle of the freedom of the seas,” alt-
hough he went on to note that “in extenuation of the measure . . . safety 
lanes were provided, and every endeavor was made by the admiralty to in-
sure the safety of neutral navigation within the area.”45 
Britain responded to the Netherlands on the issue of the laying of 
mines, but did not respond to the portion of the protest concerning the 
exclusion zone.46 Elsewhere, Britain justified its exclusion zone as “an ex-
ceptional measure, appropriate to the novel conditions under which this 
war is being carried on,”47 and as a reprisal.48  
Germany’s exclusion zone also met with protest on the part of neutral 
States, including Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States.49 
Akin to its protest to Britain, the Netherlands protested that the exclusion 
zone unlawfully encroached upon the principle of the freedom of the 
                                                                                                                      
43. GARNER, supra note 10, at 345. 
44. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Feb. 19, 1917), 
reprinted in 4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH BELLIGER-
ENT GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO NEUTRAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES 49 (1918). 
45. GARNER, supra note 10, at 352–54. 
46. Id. at 345. 
47. Id. at 333. 
48. STONE, supra note 17, at 573; ERIK JOHANNES SAKARI CASTRÉN, THE PRESENT 
LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 310 (1954). 
49. GARNER, supra note 10, at 350. 
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seas.50 The U.S. protest concerned the attacks on neutral shipping, rather 
than the establishment of the zone itself. It observed: 
 
It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government that the 
sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas 
is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effec-
tively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be 
proposed in this case. To declare or exercise the right to attack and de-
stroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first 
certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband char-
acter of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that 
this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of 
Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that en-
emy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presump-
tion that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same sus-
picion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government 
understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized.51  
 
The language of the protest demonstrates just how remarkable Germany’s 
actions were considered to have been. Germany responded to the note, 
denouncing Britain’s actions and justifying its decree as a “counter meas-
ure,” and as being necessary to “compel her adversary to conduct maritime 
warfare in accordance with international law and thus to reestablish the 
freedom of the seas.”52 At the same time, Germany conceded that there 
was no rule in the law of naval warfare that allowed it to take such 
measures, describing its measures as “new forms of maritime war.”53 In-
                                                                                                                      
50. Id. at 351 (citing Recueil de Diverses Communications du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 
aux Etats Généraux par Rapport à la Neutralité des Pays-Bas et au Respect du Droit des Gens 94–96 
(1916)). 
51. Note from U.S. Ambassador to Germany to German Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
(Feb. 10, 1915), reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 
WITH BELLIGERENT GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO NEUTRAL RIGHTS AND COMMERCE 
54 (1915). 
52. Letter from the German Minister for Foreign Affairs to [U.S.] Ambassador 
Gerard (Feb. 16, 1915), reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPOND-
ENCE WITH BELLIGERENT GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO NEUTRAL RIGHTS AND COM-
MERCE 56, 58 (1915) [hereinafter Letter from the German Minister for Foreign Affairs]. 
For an assessment of the claim, see MALLISON, supra note 4, at 65–69; Maxwell Jenkins, 
Air Attacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Gulf: The Legality of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone and 
Iranian Reprisals, 8 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 
517, 531–32 (1985). 
53. Letter from the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, supra note 52, at 58. 
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deed, Garner characterizes the decree as “so flagrantly contrary to the laws 
of maritime warfare that nothing can be said in defence of it.”54 And the 
German decree of January 1917 “was the chief cause of the outbreak of 
war between Germany and various American republics, including the Unit-
ed States.”55  
Following its entry into the war, the United States established “defen-
sive sea areas,”56 akin to those created by Japan immediately prior to the 
Russo-Japanese War. The sea areas were proclaimed around ports and har-
bors on the Atlantic coast and extended from two to ten miles.57 Regula-
tions were adopted governing the identification of vessels; entry into, and 
exit from, the designated areas; and the speed of travel.58 
The neutral States of Italy, Greece and Turkey also established security 
zones off their coastlines. Some of these extended to three miles, thus cor-
responding to the breadth of a State’s territorial sea.59 The security zones of 
other States extended beyond this limit, to nine miles beyond the territorial 
sea in the case of Ecuador and two miles beyond in the case of Argentina.60 
The belligerents protested against some of these zones but not others; 
however, none of the zones were effectively enforced.61 
In sum, the exclusion zones established during the First World War 
covered large areas of the high seas and involved the destruction of enemy 
and neutral merchant vessels. Neutral States condemned the attacks on 
neutral merchant vessels and, in some cases, also the very creation of the 
zones. The zones were justified by the States that enacted them by refer-
ence to reprisals and as novel measures in light of the prevailing circum-
stances, not through a suggestion that international law authorized their 
creation. As a result, their otherwise illegal nature was confirmed. 
 
                                                                                                                      
54. GARNER, supra note 10, at 352–54. 
55. Id. at 346.  
56. Exec. Order No. 2584 (Apr. 5, 1917), reprinted in 12 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 13 (1918). 
57. GARNER, supra note 10, at 352. 
58. Regulations for Carrying into Effect the Executive Order of the President Estab-
lishing Defensive Sea Areas (Apr. 5, 1917), reprinted in 12 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 16 (1918). 
59. Frederick C. Leiner, Maritime Security Zones: Prohibited Yet Perpetuated, 24 VIRGINIA 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 967, 975 (1984). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 975–76. 
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B. Second World War 
 
1. Neutral States 
 
On October 3, 1939, shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, 
neutral States in the Americas issued the Declaration of Panamá, which 
established a maritime neutrality zone. The preamble of the Declaration 
noted that “there can be no justification for the interests of the belligerents 
to prevail over the rights of neutrals causing disturbances and suffering to 
nations which by their neutrality in the conflict and their distance from the 
scene of events, should not be burdened with its fatal and painful conse-
quences.”62 The operative part of the Declaration provided that: 
 
As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so 
long as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to 
have those waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard 
as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the 
commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, 
whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea or air.63 
 
The waters stretched from the U.S.-Canada border, south along the coast 
of the American continent, and out to sea for approximately three hundred 
miles.64 The Inter-American Neutrality Committee issued regulations in 
April 1940, which prohibited “any hostile act or . . . any belligerent activi-
ties, such as attack, aggression, detention, capture or pursuit, the discharge 
of projectiles, the placing of mines of any kind, or any operation of war 
whether carried out from land, from sea, or from the air” in the zone.65  
The Declaration of Panamá did not purport to bind the belligerents 
without their consent. Instead, the signatories agreed to endeavor to secure 
                                                                                                                      
62. Declaration Adopted by the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American 
Republics at Panamá (Oct. 3, 1939), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-
treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-0608.pdf [hereinafter Declaration of Panamá]. 
63. Id. 
64. DANIEL PATRICK O’CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 162 
(1975).  
65. Inter-American Neutrality Committee, Recommendations Submitted to the Gov-
ernments, Members of the Pan-American Union, The Security Zone Created by the Dec-
laration of Panamá (Apr. 27 1940), reprinted in 35 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATION-
AL LAW SUPPLEMENT 38 (1941).  
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the compliance of the belligerents with the Declaration,66 but the belliger-
ents did not agree to comply. In December 1939, the German warship Graf 
Spee entered the zone while engaged with British warships; Britain and 
Germany had also sunk merchant vessels within the zone.67 Accordingly, 
the signatories of the Declaration protested against the violations of the 
zone.68 In response, the belligerents argued that their consent was required 
in order for the zone to operate. Britain argued that “the proposal, involv-
ing as it does abandonment by belligerents of certain legitimate belligerent 
rights, is not one which, on any basis of international law, can be imposed 
upon them by unilateral actions and that its adoption requires their specific 
assent.”69 France and Germany responded in a similar manner.70    
A month or so after the adoption of the Declaration, on November 4, 
1939, the United States declared a segment of the Atlantic Ocean to be a 
“combat area.” U.S. citizens vessels, and aircraft were prohibited from en-
tering it.71 The measure was designed to protect U.S. citizens from the ef-
fects of the war,72 and was thus an exclusion zone of a very different sort. 
It only purported to limit the movement of U.S. nationals and was not en-
forced in the same way as the other exclusion zones.  
 
2. Belligerent States 
 
Almost from the outset of the war, Germany established exclusion zones. 
On November 24, 1939, Germany sent a note to neutral States, in which it 
referred to the creation of the combat area by the United States and to the 
British practice of using merchant vessels for aggressive purposes, and 
warned that 
                                                                                                                      
66. Declaration of Panamá, supra note 62, ¶ 2. 
67. American Republics’ Statement on the “Graf von Spee” Incident (Dec. 23, 1939), 
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1939, at 69 (1940) (Vol. 39, U.S. Naval War 
College International Law Studies), https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e78b1004-
e8a1-4f30-bd93-3544cdd23a2c/Vol--39---International-Law-Situations--1939.aspx. 
68. Id. at 70. 
69. Belligerents’ Reply to Neutrality Zone Protest, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SITUATIONS 1939, supra note 67, at 71. 
70. Id. at 74, 76. See also Fenrick, supra note 30, at 101 (noting that the belligerents did 
not protest “over-loudly” as Britain depended on the support of the United States and 
Germany sought not to antagonize the United States). 
71. Proclamation 2376, Defining Combat Areas Under the New Neutrality Act of 
1939 (Nov. 4, 1939), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15832. 
72. Id. 
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in view of the fact that the actions are carried on with all the technical 
means of modern warfare, and in view of the fact that these actions are 
increasing in the waters around the British Isles and near the French 
coast, these waters can no longer be considered safe for neutral ship-
ping.73 
 
The note went on to recommend the use of certain shipping routes, the use 
of which would not endanger neutral shipping.74 The danger of sailing in 
the waters around Great Britain and France did not stem solely from the 
possibility of being caught in the hostilities, or due to possible misidentifi-
cation of a vessel. As recounted by counsel for Admiral Dönitz at Nurem-
berg: “[s]tarting in January [1940] the German command . . . opened up to 
the German naval forces, within the operational area announced, certain 
accurately defined zones around the British coast, in which an attack with-
out warning against all ships sailing there was admissible.”75 The Dönitz 
judgment recounts some of the orders to attack vessels: 
 
On 1 January 1940, the German U-Boat command, acting on the instruc-
tions of Hitler, ordered U-Boats to attack all Greek merchant ships in the 
zone surrounding the British Isles which was banned by the United States 
to its own ships and also merchant ships of every nationality in the lim-
ited area of the Bristol Channel. Five days later a further order was given 
to U-Boats “to make immediate unrestricted use of weapons against all 
ships” in an area of the North Sea, the limits of which were defined. Fi-
nally, on 18 January 1940, U-Boats were authorized to sink, without 
warning, all ships “in those waters near the enemy coast in which the use 
of mines can be pretended.” Exceptions were to be made in the cases of 
the United States, Italian, Japanese and Soviet ships.76   
 
                                                                                                                      
73. Note, excerpted in 18 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE IN-
TERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 
1946, at 328 (1948), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XVIII.pdf 
[hereinafter 18 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS]. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. 
76. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 558 (1948), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XXII.pdf [hereinafter 22 TRIAL 
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS]. 
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For its part, on May 8, 1940, the United Kingdom announced an exclusion 
zone in the Skagerrak. As the First Lord of the Admiralty stated before the 
House of Commons: “The usual restrictions which we have imposed on 
the actions of our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House [of Com-
mons], all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as 
opportunity served.”77  
In the exclusion zone, during the day when identification was easier, 
only German ships could be sunk. This included all German ships, whether 
warship, auxiliary or merchant vessel. At night, all ships could be sunk, in-
cluding neutral merchant vessels. According to commentators, it was 
“highly unlikely” that neutral ships were passing through the Skagerrak at 
the time in which the usual restrictions were relaxed;78 and that it was 
“most probable” that German merchant vessels were “either armed or par-
ticipating in the German naval war effort” such that they could be at-
tacked.79 Even assuming this to be the case, the relaxing of the measures 
had the effect that the “unlikely” situation in which a neutral merchant ves-
sel was present or a German merchant vessel was unarmed and participat-
ing in neutral trade would not be taken into account. What may have been 
highly likely or most probable was transformed into a blanket practice.  
A few months later, on August 17, 1940, Germany sent a declaration to 
neutral States, in which it stated that the area the United States had previ-
ously declared to be a combat area was an operational zone and that 
“[e]very ship which sails in this area exposes itself to destruction not only 
by mines but also by other combat means.”80 As recounted by counsel for 
Dönitz, “[f]rom this time on the area was fully utilized and the immediate 
use of arms against craft encountered in it was permitted to all naval and air 
forces, except where special exceptions had been ordered.”81 Unlike the 
note of November 24, 1939, safe shipping routes were not provided. Fol-
lowing the U.S. entry into the war, Germany extended the “zone of opera-
tion in which fighting may be expected” to much of the Atlantic Ocean. It 
                                                                                                                      
77. 360 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1940) col. 1351 (UK). 
78. MALLISON, supra note 4, at 86. See also, Fenrick, supra note 30, at 100 (considering 
it “unlikely”). 
79. MALLISON, supra note 4, at 86. 
80. 18 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 73, at 329. 
81. Id. 
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warned that “[e]very ship which enters this zone after June 26, 1942, will 
expose itself to destruction.”82 
As in the First World War, no differentiation was made between differ-
ent categories of vessel, for example, between merchant vessels and war-
ships, or between various uses of merchant vessels, for example, neutral 
trade and the laying of mines. Vessels were targeted by reason of their 
presence within the zone.  
Following its entry into the war, the United States engaged in unre-
stricted submarine warfare. On December 7, 1941, in a secret message to 
the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the U.S. Chief of Naval 
Operations ordered: “EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND 
SUBMARINE WARFARE.”83 
No mention was made of the zone in which unrestricted air and sub-
marine warfare was to take place, but, in practice, it amounted to the Pacif-
ic Ocean areas.84 In the interrogatories put to Admiral Nimitz, during the 
Dönitz trial, Nimitz indicated that “[f]or the purpose of command of oper-
ations against Japan the Pacific Ocean areas were declared a theater of op-
erations” and that “[t]he Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 
ordered unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan.” In response to a 
question as to whether it was “customary in such areas for submarines to 
attack merchantmen without warning with the exception of her own and 
those of her Allies?,” Admiral Nimitz responded, “Yes, with the exception 
of hospital ships and other vessels under ‘safe conduct’ voyages for human-
itarian purposes.”85 
Despite suggestions to the contrary,86 in this instance it appears that an 
exclusion zone was not formally established. A proclamation establishing 
an exclusion zone was not issued and a warning was not given to neutral 
States to avoid certain areas. Rather, a secret message was sent to U.S. Na-
                                                                                                                      
82. Berlin Radio Broadcast Recorded by the Columbia Broadcasting Company, NEW 
YORK TIMES, June 15, 1942, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 1941, at 158, 
159 (1943) (Vol. 41, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies), 
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e0be64b1-9269-4208-a18f-99627a0e37ee/Vol--
41---International-Law-Documents--1941.aspx . 
83. See MALLISON, supra note 4, at 87. 
84. Id. 
85. 40 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, 108–9 (1949), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XL.pdf [hereinafter 40 TRIAL OF 
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS]. 
86. See, e.g., Fenrick, supra note 30, at 101. 
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vy units and certain others,87 with the instruction to carry out unrestricted 
air and submarine warfare. The consequence was the creation of a de facto 
exclusion zone; however, an exclusion zone was not formally designated or 
publicized.  
Mallison notes that, “[c]onsidering the factual characteristics of the Pa-
cific war, the area of the Pacific Ocean is not an unreasonable extent for 
the United States submarine operational area.”88 Japanese merchant vessels 
were “armed, reported submarine sightings, and attempted to ram or oth-
erwise attack submarines.” Accordingly, they were “functionally incorpo-
rated into the Japanese naval forces” and thus liable to attack.89 Mallison 
also argues that, in practice, “the Pacific Ocean areas were not frequented 
by neutral shipping after December 7, 1941,”90 although he goes on to note 
that there was “a limited commerce conducted by neutral Soviet Union 
vessels.”91 The analysis of the UK practice in the Skagerrak applies here 
with equal force.  
Unlike during the First World War, rather than justifying the exclusion 
zones by reference to belligerent reprisals, or due to the novelty of the situ-
ation, it was argued by some that it was permissible to establish exclusion 
zones provided that the zones were made known to neutrals.92 During the 
trial of Admiral Dönitz, counsel for Dönitz contended that, following the 
practice of the First World War, exclusion zones were considered lawful 
under international law. He contended that  
 
[a] development, typical for the rules of naval warfare, was confirmed 
here, namely, that the modern technique of war forcibly leads to the use 
of war methods which at first are introduced in the guise of reprisals, but 
which gradually come to be employed without such a justification and 
recognized as legitimate.93 
 
                                                                                                                      
87. The message also stated: “CINCAF INFORM BRITISH AND DUTCH. IN-
FORM ARMY.” MALLISON, supra note 4, at 86. 
88. Id. at 87. 
89. Id. at 89. 
90. Id. at 89. See also Fenrick, supra note 30, at 101. 
91. MALLISON, supra note 4, at 89. See also Fenrick, supra note 30, at 101. 
92. ROBERT. W. TUCKER , THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 301 (1957) 
(Vol. 50, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (referring to E Schmitz, Sper-
rgebeite im Seekrieg, 8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND 
VOLKERRECHT 641 (1938)). See also the discussion in POLITAKIS, supra note 4, at 61–64. 
93. 18 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 73, at 329. 
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Contrary to this argument, following the practice of the First World War, 
the rules relating to attacks on merchant vessels were reaffirmed. In 1922, 
the Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in War-
fare was concluded, but did not enter into force.94 A few years later, in 
1930, a treaty was concluded on the limitation and reduction of naval ar-
maments.95 Article 22 of that treaty provided for rules relating to subma-
rines and attacks on merchant vessels. Although the treaty was drafted so 
as to remain in force only until December 31, 1936, an exception was made 
for Article 22, which was expressly drafted so as to “remain in force with-
out limit of time.”96 Prior to the expiration of the treaty, and in order to 
encourage other States to express assent to the rules,97 a Procès-Verbal was 
signed in 1936 (often referred to as the London Submarine Protocol), 
which duplicated the terms of Article 22 and to which many other States 
assented.98   
Article 22 did not purport to create new rules; rather, it set out to codi-
fy pre-existing rules of international law, as is evident from the text that 
preceded the substance: “The following are accepted as established rules of 
international law.”99 The Article provided that, “[i]n their action with regard 
to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international 
law to which surface vessels are subject.”100 It continued: 
 
In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly 
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether 
surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of naviga-
                                                                                                                      
94. Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb. 6, 
1922, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/270?OpenDocument. Article 1 provided inter 
alia that “A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and 
search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.” No exception was made for 
a merchant vessel that entered an exclusion zone. 
95. Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, 46 
Stat. 2858, 112 L.N.T.S. 65, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action 
=openDocument&documentId=32C5DA6C8C43775AC12563CD002D69CC. 
96. Id., art. 23. 
97. This encouragement formed part of the text of Article 22: “The High Contracting 
Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the above rules.”  
98. Procès-Verbal: Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of 
the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, 3 Bevans 298, 
reprinted in 31 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 137 (1939). 
99. Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, supra note 95, art. 
22. 
100. Id., art. 22(1). 
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tion a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and 
ship’s papers in a place of safety. . . .101 
 
No exception was made for exclusion zones, despite the practice of the 
First World War.102  
Although the language of the paragraph seemed to contain an exhaus-
tive list of the situations in which a warship could sink a merchant vessel or 
render it incapable of navigation, the Committee of Jurists which drafted 
the provision noted otherwise. The report of the Committee provides that: 
 
The committee wish to place it on record that the expression “merchant 
vessel,” where it is employed in the declaration, is not to be understood 
as including a merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in 
hostilities in such a manner as to cause her to lose her right to the im-
munities of a merchant vessel.103 
 
However, the Committee did not specify what amounted to participating in 
hostilities such as to cause the merchant vessel to lose immunity. What is 
evident is that it extended beyond persistent refusal to stop upon being 
summoned and active resistance to visit or search.104  
Although it has been suggested that the London Submarine Protocol 
has fallen into desuetude,105 that is not the case. It was incorporated into 
Germany’s 1939 Prize Ordinance, with which German U-boats were in-
structed to comply at the start of the war.106 Following the war, Admiral 
                                                                                                                      
101. Id., art. 22(2). 
102. This proved crucial for the International Military Tribunal. It observed that  
 
[t]he Washington Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930 and the 
Protocol of 1936 were entered into with full knowledge that such zones had been em-
ployed in that war [the First World War]. Yet the Protocol made no exception for opera-
tional zones. The order of Dönitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found with-
in these zones was, in the opinion of the Tribunal, therefore a violation of the Protocol. 
 
22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 76, at 558. 
103. PROCEEDINGS OF THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1930 AND SUPPLE-
MENTARY DOCUMENTS 189 (Herbert Francis Wright, ed., 1931). 
104. For a recent statement of the position, see SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶¶ 
60, 67. 
105. D. P. O’Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 52 (1970); Jane Gilliland, Note, Submarines and 
Targets: Suggestions for New Codified Rules of Submarine Warfare, 73 GEORGETOWN LAW JOUR-
NAL 975, 991 (1985).  
106. See 18 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 73, at 314. 
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Dönitz was charged with, inter alia, “waging unrestricted submarine warfare 
contrary to the [London Submarine Protocol],”107 and the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) determined Dönitz’s liability on this matter by ref-
erence to it.108 Some States also amended the geographical scope of applica-
tion of the Protocol in respect of their territories, and other States deposit-
ed notifications of succession.109 Accordingly, the Protocol cannot be con-
sidered to have fallen into desuetude.110  
In determining Dönitz’s guilt, the IMT distinguished between attacks 
on British armed merchant vessels and those on neutral merchant vessels, 
finding Dönitz guilty of the latter, but not the former. The part of the 
judgment that explains the difference in treatment is ambiguous at best, 
perhaps deliberately so.111 The language used suggests that the difference 
was not so much due to the nationality of the merchant vessels—enemy or 
neutral—but due to the way in which the two sorts of vessels tended to be 
used during the war. The judgment recalls that Britain “armed its merchant 
vessels,” “convoyed them with armed escort,” ordered them “to send posi-
tion reports upon sighting submarines” and later ordered them “to ram U-
Boats if possible.”112 By contrast, no mention is made of any such actions 
on the part of neutral vessels. Accordingly, implicit in the IMT’s finding is 
that the actions of Great Britain rendered British merchant vessels liable to 
attack without warning. These actions thus seemed to fall within the 
                                                                                                                      
107. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 76, at 557. 
108. Id. at 558. 
109. See Depository Status List, Procès-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine War-
fare Set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930 (Nov. 6, 1936), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proces-verbal-relating-to-the-rules-of-
submarine-warfare-set-forth-in-part-iv-of-the-treaty-of-london-of-april-22-1930-london-
6111936. 
110. See also POLITAKIS, supra note 4, at 157; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law 
of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
463, 519–20 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). That does not mean that all the substantive 
rules of the Protocol continue to reflect the law. While it is generally accepted that in their 
action with respect to merchant vessels submarines must conform to the same rules of 
international law as surface vessels, the instances in which a merchant vessel may be at-
tacked has since been clarified. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶¶ 60, 67, 139, 
140, 151, 152. 
111. See Fenrick, supra note 30, at 103 (noting that this portion of the judgment was 
written by the U.S. member of the Tribunal, Francis Biddle, who was opposed to Dönitz’s 
conviction on the charges relating to submarine warfare, and that the rest of the bench 
allowed Biddle to write the section relating to the charges in order to avoid his threatened 
dissent). 
112. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 76, at 558. 
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Committee of Jurists’ notion of participating in hostilities in such a manner 
as to result in the loss of immunity.113 
Thus, the Dönitz judgment does not stand for the proposition that en-
emy merchant vessels generally may be attacked. Furthermore, despite sug-
gestions to the contrary,114 the judgment does not stand for the proposition 
that all neutral merchant vessels are protected from attack even if they are 
armed, report on sightings of submarines and so on. Although this was in-
deed the practice of many neutral vessels during the war, the IMT seems to 
have ignored it; no mention is made of the practice in the Tribunal’s judg-
ment. Indeed, whereas the judgment refers to “British armed merchant 
vessels,” it only refers to “neutral merchant vessels,” omitting the reference 
to their being armed.115 The alternative reading, by which all neutral mer-
chant vessels are protected from attack, does not sit easily with the London 
Submarine Protocol, which the Tribunal was interpreting, or the report of 
the Committee of Jurists, which did not differentiate between enemy mer-
chant vessels and neutral ones. The crucial distinction insofar as the Proto-
col is concerned, is not the nationality of the merchant vessel (enemy or 
neutral), but on the activities it undertakes (whether it is participating in 
hostilities or not). The alternative approach would be unrealistic. A bellig-
erent is highly unlikely to withhold taking measures against a neutral mer-
chant vessel if that vessel is participating in hostilities; nor should it be re-
quired to do so.116 
The IMT also held that, in light of the order of the British Admiralty 
concerning the Skagerrak and in light of Admiral Nimitz’s answers con-
cerning unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific, “the sentence of 
Dönitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international 
law of submarine warfare.”117 Dönitz was still found guilty of the con-
duct—confirming its illegality—but his sentence did not reflect the illegali-
ty in light of the related illegality on the part of Britain and the United 
States. The IMT thus confirmed the continued relevance of the London 
Submarine Protocol as well as the illegality of the enforcement of the ex-
clusion zones of the Second World War type.  
Indeed, unlike the legal basis for Germany’s measures, as argued by 
counsel for Dönitz, Admiral Nimitz considered the order of December 7, 
                                                                                                                      
113. See Fenrick, supra note 30, at 102. 
114. See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 110, at 520.  
115. See 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 76, at 557–58. 
116. See MALLISON, supra note 4, at 82, 129–30. 
117. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 76, at 559. 
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1941 to have been issued as a reprisal.118 His interrogatories relating to the 
Dönitz trial provide: 
 
17. Q. Has any order of the U.S. Naval authorities mentioned in the 
above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S. submarines toward 
Japanese merchantmen been based on the grounds of reprisal? If yes, 
what orders? 
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7 Decem-
ber 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese tactics revealed on 
that date. No further orders to U.S. submarines concerning tactics toward 
Japanese merchantmen throughout the war were based on reprisal, alt-
hough specific instances of Japanese submarines committing atrocities 
toward U.S. merchant marine survivors became known and would have 
justified such a course. . . . 
19. Q. On the basis of what Japanese tactics was the reprisal consid-
ered justified? 
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the Chief 
of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified by the Japanese 
attacks on that date on U.S. bases, and on both armed and unarmed ships 
and nationals, without warning or declaration of war.119 
 
The practice of exclusion zones in the Second World War was thus similar 
to that of the First World War, in that the concept of an exclusion zone 
was inextricably linked with the measures that could be taken within the 
zone, namely attack on sight. The exclusion zones of the Second World 
War were justified both on the basis of belligerent reprisals and on the ba-
sis of a rule of law that authorized it. However, the IMT was clear that at-
tacking all vessels within an exclusion zone on sight was unlawful, even if it 
was less than clear as to which vessels could lawfully be attacked and on 
what basis. 
 
C. Armed Conflict Over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas 
 
During the 1982 armed conflict between the UK and Argentina over the 
Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, numerous zones were established.  
 
                                                                                                                      
118. But see MALLISON, supra note 4, at 90–91 (noting that, apart from Nimitz’s an-
swers, “there is no indication that reprisal has been used to justify the United States opera-
tional area”).  
119. 40 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 85, at 111. 
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1. United Kingdom Practice 
 
A few days after the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands/Islas 
Malvinas, on April, 7 1982, the UK issued a notice, indicating that, from 
April 12, a Maritime Exclusion Zone would be in force. The outer limit of 
the zone was a circle of two hundred nautical mile radius from the center 
of the islands. The notice continued: 
 
From the time indicated, any Argentine warships and Argentine naval 
auxiliaries found within this zone will be treated as hostile and are liable 
to be attacked by British forces. This measure is without prejudice to the 
right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may 
be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter.120 
 
As is apparent from the language of the notice, aside from actions taken in 
self-defense pursuant to Article 51, only Argentine warships and Argentine 
naval auxiliaries within the zone were liable to attack. The passage of Ar-
gentine merchant vessels and neutral merchant vessels were not impeded 
and the freedom of the high seas for those vessels was unaffected. The 
measure did not therefore amount to a blockade,121 as was argued at the 
time by Argentina.122 As Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries 
were military objectives and thus targetable at any location in which acts of 
naval warfare could be carried out, the Maritime Exclusion Zone was evi-
dently lawful. Indeed, one commentator suggested that the zone was a “cu-
rious” one as, “[i]n time of armed conflict at sea, such a limit would restrict 
action by the Royal Navy to an extent not required by international law.”123 
Reportedly, the declaration of the zone was a ruse, as it served to reinforce 
                                                                                                                      
120. See Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N., Letter Dated 9 April 1982 from the 
Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/14963 (Apr. 10, 1982).  
121. For the definition of a blockade, see supra note 7.  
122. See Permanent Representative of Argentina to the U.N., Letter Dated 9 April 
1982 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/14961 (Apr. 9, 1982).  
123. See Fenrick, supra note 30, at 109 n.65 (quoting Col. G.I.A.D. Draper, Letter to 
the Editor, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 1982, at 5), 
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an Argentine belief that a British nuclear submarine was already in the area 
when, in fact, it was in Scotland.124 
Some two weeks later, on April 23, 1982, the UK communicated the 
establishment of a defensive bubble surrounding the Task Force that was 
on its way to the Falkland Islands. The notification establishing the defen-
sive bubble provided that: 
  
[A]ny approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, 
naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to in-
terfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic, will 
encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil 
aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British forces will be regarded as 
hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.125 
 
The notification also indicated that the defensive bubble was established 
pursuant to Britain’s right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Char-
ter.126 
Unlike the April 7 declaration, and in the nature of a defensive bubble, 
no geographic limitation was placed on the bubble. As the Task Force 
moved, so too did the bubble. Akin to the analysis of the April 7 declara-
tion, insofar as the first sentence is concerned, the listed objects could be 
targeted at any location,127 irrespective of any approach to the defensive 
bubble. Accordingly, the measure set out in the first sentence is uncontro-
versial. The lack of punctuation in the final sentence, however, renders it 
unclear. Reading the phrase to the effect that “all Argentine aircraft, includ-
ing civil aircraft, engaging in surveillance would be treated as hostile,” 
would be uncontroversial as engaging in surveillance might render the air-
                                                                                                                      
124. L.F.E. Goldie, Maritime War Zones & Exclusion Zones, in THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 156, 172 (Horace B. Robertson Jr. ed., 1991) (Vol. 64, U.S. Naval War Col-
lege International Law Studies); Howard S. Levie, The Falkland Islands Crisis and the Laws of 
War, in PROFESSOR HOWARD LEVIE AND THE LAW OF WAR 203, 203–4 (Michael N. 
Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 70, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies). 
125. See Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to the U.N., Letter Dated 24 April 1982 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United 
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/14997 (Apr. 24, 
1982).  
126. Id. 
127. Aside from certain areas such as the territorial sea of neutral States. 
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craft a military objective and thus liable to attack.128 However, if the sen-
tence meant “all Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaging in sur-
veillance, would be treated as hostile,” it would be overly-broad by reason 
of including enemy civil aircraft, for example passenger jets, whether or not 
they were conducting surveillance.129  
A few days later, on April 28, a Total Exclusion Zone around the Falk-
land Islands was established. The Total Exclusion Zone encompassed the 
same geographical area as the Maritime Exclusion Zone. However, as its 
name suggests, its scope ratione personae was broader. The announcement 
establishing the Total Exclusion Zone read: 
 
From the time indicated, the exclusion zone will apply not only to Argen-
tine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, 
whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the il-
legal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The exclu-
sion zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, operat-
ing in support of the illegal occupation. Any ship and any aircraft, wheth-
er military or civil, which is found within this zone without due authority 
from the Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded as operating in 
support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile 
and will be liable to be attacked by the British forces.130 
 
The announcement also indicated that the UK reserved the right to take 
additional measures in exercise of its right to self-defense.131 A UK 
spokesman clarified that the Total Exclusion Zone “applied to all ships and 
all aircraft, including any Soviet spy ships that might be trailing British 
                                                                                                                      
128. A later publication of the notification did include punctuation in this manner. See 
Text of the British Statement on Extending Blockade Area, NEW YORK TIMES, May 8, 1982, at 4, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/08/world/text-of-the-british-statement-on-
extending-blockade-area.html.  
129. Argentina seems to have read the notification in this manner. See Permanent 
Representative of Argentina to the U.N., Letter Dated 24 April 1982 from the Permanent 
Representative of Argentina to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Se-
curity Council, U.N. Doc. S/14998 (Apr. 24, 1982). 
130. See Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to the U.N., Letter Dated 28 April 1982 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United 
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/15006 (Apr. 28, 
1982). 
131. Id. 
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forces inside the Zone.”132 Any ship or aircraft which was found in the 
zone and which was not authorized to be there was deemed to be operat-
ing in support of the occupation, regarded as hostile, and liable to attack. 
As with the exclusion zones of the First and Second World Wars, mere 
presence in the exclusion zone rendered the vessel targetable.  
Later still, on May 7, shortly after the sinking of the Belgrano,133 the UK 
issued a press statement, which provided that 
 
[b]ecause of the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that hos-
tile forces can cover undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, 
Her Majesty’s Government warns that any Argentine warship or military 
aircraft which are found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine 
coast will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with according-
ly.134 
 
As with its Maritime Exclusion Zone, the statement was directed at Argen-
tine warships and military aircraft, not Argentine merchant vessels or civil 
aircraft, or neutral vessels. As such objects were military objectives and tar-
getable in any area in which acts of naval warfare could be carried out, the 
statement is likely to have been issued as a clarification, in light of criticism 
regarding the sinking of the Belgrano.135 Given its limitation to these ships 
and aircraft, it did not amount to a blockade as alleged by Argentina at the 
time.136 
The USSR objected that: 
 
The British Government continues expanding the zone of combat opera-
tions in the Atlantic Ocean, arbitrarily proclaiming vast expanses of high 
                                                                                                                      
132. Fenrick, supra note 30, at 111 (citing THE TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 1982, at 1).  
133. The General Belgrano was an Argentine warship that was attacked whilst outside 
the Total Exclusion Zone. The attack was criticised in certain quarters on the grounds that 
the warship was located outside the Total Exclusion Zone and sailing away from the Zone 
at the time of the attack. However, as a warship, the Belgrano could be targeted by the UK 
pursuant to the law of armed conflict at sea at any location in which hostile actions could 
lawfully take place. 
134. Press Statement of 7 May 1982, reproduced in 53 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 549 (1982).   
135. POLITAKIS, supra note 4, at 140 (suggesting that “the intention was to accord a 
posteriori legitimacy to the widely condemned torpedoing of the General Belgrano”). 
136. See Permanent Representative of Argentina to the U.N., Letter Dated 7 May 
1982 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/15055 (May 7, 1982). 
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seas closed to ships and aircraft of other countries. These actions clearly 
contradict the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and, consequently, are 
regarded by the Soviet side as unlawful.137 
 
Aside from the USSR, the exclusion zones did not generally receive con-
demnation on the part of the international community.138 
 
2. Argentine Practice 
 
For its part, Argentina also established exclusion zones, as reactions to the 
British exclusion zones. On April 8, following the notification by the UK 
of the maritime exclusion zone, Argentina declared a maritime exclusion 
zone of 200 miles “around the Falklands, South Georgia, and the Argen-
tine coast as a theatre of operations in which military action could be taken 
if necessary for self-defence.”139 On April 30, following the notification of 
the defensive bubble, Argentina notified that: 
 
[A]ll British ships, including merchant and fishing vessels, operating with-
in the 200-mile zone of the Argentine sea, of the Malvinas Islands, the 
South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands, are considered hostile; 
. . .  
any British aircraft, whether military or civil, which flies through Argen-
tine airspace will be considered hostile and treated accordingly . . .140     
 
Argentina also indicated that these measures were without prejudice to ad-
ditional measures that might be taken in self-defense.141 Following the issu-
ance of the British policy statement, on May 11, Argentina declared that, 
“any vessel flying the United Kingdom flag which is navigating in the 
[South Atlantic] towards the area of operations and/or which may be pre-
                                                                                                                      
137. See Serge Schmemann, British War Zones Called Unlawful in Soviet Protest, NEW 
YORK TIMES, May 15, 1982, at 1, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/15/world/british-
war-zones-called-unlawful-in-soviet-protest.html. 
138. For possible reasons as to the general silence, see Part III.E. 
139. See Fenrick, supra note 30, at 112 (citing THE TIMES (London), Apr. 10, 1982, at 
1). 
140. Permanent Representative of Argentina to the U.N., Letter Dated 30 April 1982 
from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/15018 (Apr. 30, 1982). 
141. Id. 
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sumed to constitute a threat to national security shall be considered hostile, 
and action will be taken accordingly.”142  
Both measures differentiated between enemy vessels and neutral ves-
sels, with the latter left unaffected. However, one neutral vessel was at-
tacked by Argentina while in the zone. The Hercules, a Liberian tanker, was 
located some five hundred miles off the Falkland Islands and engaged in 
passage unrelated to the armed conflict when it was attacked.143 The attack 
on the Hercules reveals the dangers associated with the establishment of an 
exclusion zone. Insofar as the British vessels were concerned, Argentina 
did not differentiate between warships and auxiliaries on the one hand and 
merchant vessels on the other.144 Rather, it indicated that all British ships 
would be considered as hostile and treated accordingly. It has been sug-
gested that it is “probable” that any British merchant vessel or civil aircraft 
approaching the Maritime Exclusion Zone following the April 30 procla-
mation would have been supporting the British task force and thus subject 
to attack.145 However, as with the exclusion zones of the Second World 
War, this is to convert what is “probable” into a bright line rule. This is all 
the more true of the May 11 proclamation, which provided that the entire 
South Atlantic was a war zone, given the increased possibility of a British 
vessel, unconnected with the armed conflict, being in the zone.146  
 
D. Armed Conflict between Iran and Iraq 
 
On September 22, 1980, Iraq launched an attack on Iran. Iran responded, 
on the same day, by issuing a notice to mariners which read: 
 
Regarding to the Iraqi aggression we declare Iranian maritime border 
nearby coast war area. 
                                                                                                                      
142. Permanent Representative of Argentina to the U.N., Letter Dated 11 May 1982 
from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/15069 (May 11, 1982). 
143. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation v Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d 
Cir. 1987), rev’d 488 U.S. 428. 
144. The UK also used “ships taken up from trade” (STUFT) to transport troops and 
supplies in support of the military response. These vessels would have been acting as aux-
iliary vessels and thus would have been lawful targets.   
145. Fenrick, supra note 30, at 112–13. 
146. Id. at 113. 
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The Iranian Government does not give any authorization to the vessels 
intending to proceed to Iraqi ports for the safety of shipping in Persian 
Gulf the following route shall be strictly observed . . .147 
 
Iran thus adopted three measures. It declared its coastal waters to be a war 
zone; it provided an alternative shipping route; and, although not character-
ized as such, it instituted a blockade of Iraqi ports.148 The United States re-
issued the warning to mariners, but noted that the publication “in no way 
constitutes a legal recognition by the United States of the international va-
lidity of any rule, regulation or proclamation so published.”149 
Insofar as the war zone was concerned, the contours of the zone were 
not specified, but it was limited to the territorial sea of Iran and adjacent 
waters on the high seas. Iran’s closure of its territorial sea is less problemat-
ic.150 Even in peacetime, subject to certain exceptions, notably international 
straits, a State may temporarily suspend innocent passage of foreign ships if 
such suspension is essential to protect its security.151 To the extent that the 
closure extended outside Iran’s territorial waters to part of the high seas, it 
was limited in its extent, defensive in nature, and interfered only to a lim-
ited extent with free passage of neutral vessels.152 In many ways, it was akin 
                                                                                                                      
147. Notice to Mariners No. 17/59, Sept. 22, 1980, reprinted in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
(1980–1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 37 (Andrea de Guttry & Natalino Ronz-
itti eds., 1993). A slightly different version, to the same effect, reads:  
 
Bearing in mind the violations of the Iraqi armed forces, all waterways near the Iranian 
shores are hereby declared war zones. Iran will not allow any merchant ship to carry cargo 
to the Iraqi ports. Also, for the sake of the safety of shipping in the Persian Gulf, we an-
nounce that the following routes should be observed. . . . 
 
Notice to Mariners No. 17/59, Sept. 22, 1980, reprinted in S.P. Menefee, Commentary, in THE 
IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra, at 147.  
148. See J. Ashley Roach, Missiles on Target: Targeting and Defense Zones in the Tanker War, 
31 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 593, 601 (1991). 
149. Defense Mapping Agency and Hydrographic Center, Special Warning No. 48 
(Sep. 22, 1980), reprinted in Menefee, supra note 147, at 134. 
150. Though there might be some dispute as to the relevant baseline and thus the ex-
tent of Iran’s territorial sea. See J. ASHELY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MAR-
ITIME CLAIMS 89 (2012). 
151. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 16(3)–(4), Apr. 
29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 25(3), 44. Roach, supra note 148, 
at 602, notes that “[i]t would seem that ‘temporarily’ can properly last for the duration of 
the hostilities, even in a war of this extraordinary length.” 
152. See Ross Leckow, The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf: The Law of War Zones, 37 IN-
TERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 629, 639 (1988); Roach, supra note 148, 
at 601–2. 
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to the zone established by Japan immediately prior to the Russo-Japanese 
War.  
For its part, responding to Iran’s establishment of a war zone, on Oc-
tober 7, 1980, Iraq indicated that the area of the Persian Gulf north of 29° 
30’ N was a “prohibited war zone.”153 On August 12, 1982, Iraq expanded 
its war zone. According to a warning reissued by the United States: 
 
The Iraqi government has warned that it will attack all vessels appearing 
within a zone believed to be north and east of a line connecting the fol-
lowing points. . . . The Iraqi government has further warned that all tank-
ers docking at Kharg Island, regardless of nationality, are targets for the 
Iraqi air force.154  
 
The contours of the zone were subsequently amended and Iraq issued fur-
ther warnings relating to the possibility of attacks.155 As with Iran’s zones, 
the United States passed on the warnings, but indicated that doing so did 
not constitute legal recognition of the zones.156 A report of the UK House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee also indicated that the war zones 
of both Iran and Iraq were “not generally recognised by the foreign na-
vies.”157 
Iraq justified its actions on the basis of self-defense,158 and considered 
declarations establishing war zones to be lawful.159 It considered its declara-
                                                                                                                      
153. Defense Mapping Agency and Hydrographic Center, Special Warning No. 50 
(Oct. 7, 1980), reprinted in Menefee, supra note 147, at 135. 
154. Defense Mapping Agency and Hydrographic Center, Special Warning No. 62 
(Aug. 16, 1982), reprinted in Menefee, supra note 147, at 136. See also Andrea Gioia, Commen-
tary, in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 
147, at 73. 
155. Gioia, supra note 154, at 73; Roach, supra note 148, at 605; Adam Boleslaw 
Boczek, Law of Warfare at Sea and Neutrality: Lessons from the Gulf War, 20 OCEAN DEVEL-
OPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 244 (1989). 
156. Defense Mapping Agency and Hydrographic Center, Special Warning No. 67 
(Sep. 1985), reprinted in Menefee, supra note 147, at 139. 
157. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SECOND REPORT, CURRENT UK POLICY TO-
WARDS THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT, 1987–88, HC 279-I-II, reprinted in THE IRAN-IRAQ 
WAR (1980–1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 147, at 302. 
158. Permanent Representative of Iraq to the U.N., Letter Dated 5 May 1983 from 
the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/38/187, S/15752 (May 9, 1983) [hereinafter Letter from the Per-
manent Representative of Iraq]. 
159. Michaelsen, supra note 1, at 375 (indicating that Iraq also justified the establish-
ment on the basis of reprisals). 
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tion establishing the war zone to be “in conformity with rules of interna-
tional law which are applicable in times of armed conflict and which have 
the object of limiting the suffering caused by such conflicts and sparing 
mankind the consequences to which military operations might give rise.”160 
This is one of the few occasions on which a State has justified its estab-
lishment of an exclusion zone by reference to a rule of international law it 
claims authorizes it. In prior conflicts, the zones tended to be justified on 
the basis of reprisals, self-defense, or some other exceptional measure.  
Later, Iraq also justified its actions pursuant to the law of blockade. In 
this respect, Iraq referred to “those provisions of international law which 
authorize a State which is a party to an armed conflict to impose a blockade 
on the ports of the adversary State, within a precisely defined zone made 
known to all, in order to induce that State to accept peace.”161 Although 
characterized as a blockade, Iraq sought to enforce the measure by attack-
ing vessels without warning. By contrast, the consequence of a breach of 
blockade is capture.162 Accordingly, Iraq’s measure was more in the nature 
of an exclusion zone than a blockade.  
The establishment of the zones did not have a containing effect. De-
spite their establishment, Iran, and to a lesser degree Iraq, did not limit 
their attacks to the zones.163 Both Iran and Iraq attacked merchant vessels 
of neutral and enemy States.164 The attacks on neutral shipping generally, 
and in international waters and en route to and from neutral States specifi-
cally, were condemned.165 Neutral States also protested against the at-
tacks.166 There was little comment on the zones as such; however, as indi-
                                                                                                                      
160. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq, supra note 158. 
161. Permanent Representative of Iraq to the U.N., Letter Dated 20 February 1985 
from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secre-
tary-General, S/16972 (Feb. 20, 1985). 
162 Pursuant to the law of blockade, “[m]erchant vessels believed on reasonable 
grounds to be breaching a blockade may be captured.” See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 
6, ¶ 98. Only if, after prior warning, a merchant vessel clearly resists capture may it be at-
tacked. Id. 
163. 85 percent of Iraqi attacks on merchant ships took place within one of the three 
exclusion zones. Roach, supra note 148, at 605. 
164. See Jenkins, supra note 52, at 546 n.314. 
165. See S.C. Res. 552 (June 1, 1984); S.C. Res. 582 (Feb. 24, 1986). 
166. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., 2546th mtg., ¶¶ 23, 33, 78, 92 , U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.2546 (June 1, 1984) (noting protests from China, the Netherlands, the UK and In-
dia). See also Alan Vaughan Lowe, Commentary, in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988) AND 
THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 147, at 251. 
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cated above, while not condemning exclusion zones, some States indicated 
that they did not accept them.  
Although the attacks are often condemned as unlawful,167 it is inappro-
priate to judge them as such as a whole. Many attacks were indeed unlaw-
ful, such as those that were carried out against neutral ships when they 
were “engaging in truly neutral commerce,”168 or “fishing in the Gulf.”169 
Iran also attacked vessels after having stopped them and searched them for 
contraband,170 and attacked vessels that were in neutral territorial waters.171 
Other attacks seem to have been lawful, such as Iraqi attacks against tank-
ers that were travelling in convoy with Iranian warships.172 The legality of 
many attacks, however, turns on whether a contribution to the war-
sustaining effort renders an object a military objective.173 Both parties car-
ried out attacks in order to deprive the other side of the income from oil 
exports that was used to wage the armed conflict.174 Indeed, Iraq justified 
its attacks “on the basis of the rules of international law relating to armed 
conflicts at sea, which permit attacks on vessels engaged in acts of trade or 
unneutral service with a belligerent in a situation of armed conflict.”175 It 
continued: 
 
We trust that the Secretary-General and the organizations whose appeals 
have been conveyed do not contest the fact that lifting Iranian oil, and 
consequently providing Iran with financial resources which enable it to 
continue its aggression against Iraq . . . is impermissible trade under in-
                                                                                                                      
167. See, e.g., Leckow, supra note 152, at 637, 640 (suggesting that all attacks were un-
lawful).  
168. Roach, supra note 148, at 603. 
169. Goldie, supra note 124, at 176. 
170. Boczek, supra note 155, at 247. 
171. Id. at 245; Fenrick, supra note 30, at 120. 
172. Boczek, supra note 155, at 244. 
173. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Current Legal Issues in Maritime Operations: Maritime 
Interception Operations in the Global War on Terrorism, Exclusion Zones, Hospital Ships, and Mari-
time Neutrality, in ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 207, 216 
(Richard B. Jaques ed., 2006) (Vol. 80, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
See also Fenrick, supra note 30, at 121.  
174. Goldie, supra note 124, at 175; Roach, supra note 148, at 605 (reporting that “over 
70% (146 of 205) of the Iraqi attacks on merchant ships were against tankers”). 
175. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, Annex 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/18480 (Nov. 26, 1986). See also Permanent Representative of Iraq to the U.N., Letter 
dated 20 February 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations 
Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/16972 (Feb. 20, 1985). 
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ternational law in the context of the armed conflict between Iran and 
Iraq.176  
 
Iran seemed to justify its actions on the basis of reprisals, arguing that Iraq 
was attacking foreign vessels in the Persian Gulf indiscriminately and had 
disrupted freedom of navigation and commerce. Iran also argued that third 
States had 
 
pour[ed] extensive financial and material resources into Iraq, encouraging 
it to threaten commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, and yet they wish 
to remain secure from the consequences of their obvious backing of the 
aggressor Iraq in its war of aggression against us as well as against interna-
tional peace and security.177 
 
Iran argued further that “[i]f the security of the Persian Gulf is violated, 
then it is violated for all” and that it would not permit the Persian Gulf to 
be closed to it or to be used by others against it.178  
Of particular importance for present purposes is the policy of attacking 
all vessels in the exclusion zones. Although it has been suggested that Iraq’s 
targeting of all vessels in the Iranian exclusion zone can be justified on the 
basis that the exclusion zone kept out neutral vessels, that large radar re-
turns from a ship within the zone were assumed to be tankers carrying Ira-
nian oil, and that “there is no evidence that any protected vessels were 
found within the Iranian exclusion zone,”179 this transforms the general 
practice into an absolute one. Indeed, the same author notes that one of 
the ships that was hit was, in fact, prima facie “entitled to protected status: a 
shrimp trawler that was hit by Iraq within Iran’s exclusion zone.”180  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
176. Id. 
177. Permanent Representative of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated 25 May 1984 from 
the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/16585 (May 25, 1984). 
178. Id.  
179. Roach, supra note 148, at 607. 
180. Id. at 607 n.51. Small coastal fishing vessels are protected against attack and, in-
deed, capture. See Convention No. XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the 
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War art. 3, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 
544; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 47(g). 
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E. Summary 
 
One of the key features of this second phase of exclusion zones is that the 
establishment of an exclusion zone was inextricably linked with the 
measures that could be taken within it. For example, writing in 1922, short-
ly after the exclusion zones of the First World War, Hyde defined an exclu-
sion zone as “an area of water which a belligerent attempts to control, and 
within which it denies to foreign shipping generally the same measure of 
protection which the latter might elsewhere justly claim.”181 An exclusion 
zone was thus defined by reference to the measures that could be taken 
within it, measures that afforded far less protection to vessels that were 
within the zone as compared to what they would receive were they outside 
the zone. Other explanations of exclusion zones of this period were more 
specific, referring explicitly to the possibility of attacks within the zone re-
gardless of the identity of the vessel. For example, before the IMT, counsel 
for Dönitz argued that: “[w]hether these areas are designated as military 
area, barred zone, operational area, or danger zone, the point always re-
mained that the naval forces in the area determined had permission to de-
stroy any ship encountered there.”182 Indeed, O’Connell explained that “the 
only purpose in declaring a war zone is to circumvent the difficulties of iden-
tification by supposing all contacts to be hostile.”183 
Views of this sort continued to be expressed up until the early 1990s. 
For example, writing in 1988, Leckow noted that: “[i]n a war zone . . . a 
belligerent purports to suspend the rules of naval warfare, normally 
through the use of minefields and submarines, rendering the area danger-
ous for the merchant traffic of enemy or neutral countries.”184 Likewise, in 
his influential article on exclusion zones, Fenrick referred to the conse-
quences of unauthorized entry into an exclusion zone: “[u]nauthorized 
ships or aircraft entering the zone do so at the risk of facing sanctions, of-
ten including being attacked by missiles, aircraft, submarines, or surface 
warships, or of running into minefields.”185 The key concept of the exclu-
                                                                                                                      
181. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED 
AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 423–24 (1922).  
182. 18 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 73, at 329. 
183. O’CONNELL, supra note 64, at 167 (emphasis added). 
184. Leckow, supra note 152, at 632. For descriptions of a war zone along similar 
lines, see POLITAKIS, supra note 4, at 38, 127; Karl Zemanek, War Zones, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981). 
185. Fenrick, supra note 30, at 92. See also Michaelsen, supra note 1, at 365. 
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sion zone thus related to the measures that could be taken within it; 
measures which could not be taken outside it.  
However, the close link between the creation of an exclusion zone and 
its enforcement is not without doubt. At times, States were critical of the 
enforcement of zones, but not of their creation. For example, during the 
First World War, the United States objected to the German practice of at-
tacking vessels within the zones. In the view of the United States, the 
proper course of action involved the visit and search of the vessels within 
the zone.186 Likewise, during the Iran-Iraq armed conflict, it was the attacks 
on neutral shipping that were condemned rather than the establishment of 
the zones.187  
The distinction between the creation of an exclusion zone and the en-
forcement of that zone can prove important. A case in point is the British 
Total Exclusion Zone, created during the Falklands/Malvinas armed con-
flict. Unlike the exclusion zones established during the two world wars, 
neither neutral vessels nor Argentine merchant vessels that were entitled to 
protection were attacked within the zone.188 A fishing vessel, the Narwal, 
was attacked. However, it was spying on the movements of the British fleet 
and transmitting the information back to Argentina.189 As a result of its ac-
tions, it did not benefit from the protections afforded to merchant vessels 
at the time of the attack. Accordingly, unlike the zones of the world wars, 
the Total Exclusion Zone cannot be condemned for violation of the law 
relating to targeting.190 
This does not mean that the establishment of the Total Exclusion 
Zone was necessarily lawful. The zone might be considered a threat to 
commit a violation of the law of armed conflict at sea. However, threats to 
commit violations of that body of law are not unlawful per se. Only if a par-
ticular rule of the law of armed conflict at sea prohibits threats will the 
threats be unlawful,191 as there is no liability for threats under the secondary 
                                                                                                                      
186. See supra p. 164. 
187. See supra p. 185. 
188. Leckow, supra note 152, at 634; Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 110, at 524. 
189. Levie, supra note 124, at 206–7 (citing CHRISTOPHER DOBSON, THE FALKLANDS 
CONFLICT 104 (1982)). 
190. But certain commentators do consider the exclusion zone illegal precisely for this 
reason. See, e.g., Fausto Pocar, Missile Warfare and Exclusion Zones in Naval Warfare, 27 ISRA-
EL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 215, 221 (1998). 
191. But see Note of February 10, 1915, reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIPLO-
MATIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH BELLIGERENT GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO NEUTRAL 
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rules of international law. With some exceptions, the law of armed conflict 
does not generally prohibit threats.192 Although, as noted by the ICRC 
Commentary on Additional Protocol II, “the use of threats will generally 
constitute violence to mental well-being,”193 in the context of the estab-
lishment of an exclusion zone, the threat is not aimed at, or issued to, a 
particular individual. Accordingly, it is one step removed and would unlike-
ly amount to such violence. Furthermore, the announcement establishing 
the Total Exclusion Zone refers to ships and aircraft within the zone as 
being “liable to be attacked.”194 Thus, the UK could give effect to the zone 
in such a manner that does not violate its international obligations, for ex-
ample, by attacking vessels that constituted military objectives and escort-
ing other vessels out of the zone. 
Indeed, the announcement might have constituted a ruse.195 A ruse 
“consists either of inducing an adversary to make a mistake by deliberately 
deceiving him, or of inducing him to commit an imprudent act, though 
without necessarily deceiving him to this end,”196 and is permitted under 
the law of armed conflict at sea.197 In issuing an announcement to the ef-
fect that all vessels and aircraft within a certain area might be attacked on 
sight, enemy forces might stay away from the area. However, neutral ves-
sels and aircraft might also avoid the area, raising the issue of whether and 
to what extent exclusion zones can impinge on the freedom of the seas. 
This is a matter that is discussed in Part IV below. Suffice it to note at this 
stage that the Total Exclusion Zone was away from major shipping routes. 
The key point for present purposes is that the establishment of an exclu-
sion zone can be separated from its enforcement.  
A second feature of the practice of exclusion zones during this period 
concerns the measures that were used to enforce them. These measures 
                                                                                                                      
RIGHTS AND COMMERCE 54 (1915) (considering the declaration of a right to attack all 
vessels within a zone as being unprecedented). 
192. Exceptions include the SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 43. The jus ad bellum 
does prohibit the threat of force. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
193. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1376 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PRO-
TOCOLS]. 
194. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, supra note 130 (emphasis added). 
195. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 173, at 217. 
196. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 193, at 441.  
197. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 110 (prohibiting certain acts). 
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reflected the technological advances during the periods in question, for ex-
ample, the use of submarine attacks during the Second World War and at-
tacks by air during the Iran-Iraq conflict. The general practice of the period 
seems to have been that all enemy vessels could be targeted within an ex-
clusion zone, irrespective of whether they were warships or enemy mer-
chant vessels. The proclamations establishing the zones often extended the 
possibility of attack to neutral vessels, and, in many cases, this resulted in 
neutral merchant vessels being attacked. Writings of the period suggest 
that, during an armed conflict, only vessels assisting the war effort would 
be present within the area in question. However, this transformed a ten-
dency into a blanket proposition, resulting in attacks on neutral merchant 
vessels. 
A third feature of this period concerns the changing justification for 
the establishment of exclusion zones. States that established the zones jus-
tified their creation on the basis of exceptional measures—reprisals, neces-
sity, or self-defense. Only rarely did States justify the measures on the basis 
of a positive rule of international law that authorized their creation.   
Finally, also evident from the practice of exclusion zones during this 
period is that relatively few States issued protests against their creation. 
Many States were simply unaffected by the exclusion zones, for example 
because they were not a maritime power or because the zone did not cover 
an area through which their vessels passed. Accordingly, there was little 
need for them to protest. Other States did not protest for political reasons, 
for example, due to tacit or active support for one party to the conflict or 
another. Those States that did protest tended to focus on the measures that 
were taken to enforce the zone rather than on the zone itself. Most of the 
protests thus concerned attacks on neutral shipping. For example, the Se-
curity Council condemned the attacks on neutral merchant vessels during 
the Iran-Iraq war rather than the zones themselves.198 Only on occasion did 
States protest against the zones themselves. Where the concerns expressed 
by States did relate to the creation of the zone, the criticisms tended to re-
late to infringement of the freedom of the seas.199 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
198. See e.g., S.C. Res. 552, supra note 165; S.C. Res. 582, supra note 165. 
199. See, e.g., Schmemann, supra note 137 (reporting on the USSR’s protest of the 
UK’s Total Exclusion Zone as infringing on high seas freedoms); Garner, supra note 38 
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IV. THE SAN REMO MANUAL CONCEPT OF AN EXCLUSION ZONE 
 
A fundamental change in the approach taken to exclusion zones can be 
found in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Con-
flicts at Sea, which was prepared between 1988 and 1994.200 It approached 
the issue of exclusion zones differently from the practice described above 
in two principal respects. First, it separated out the establishment of an ex-
clusion zone from the measures that could be taken within it. Second, it 
purported to regulate the zones should belligerents decide to create them. 
Although not a source of international law in the sense of Article 38(1)(a)–
(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,201 the San Remo Man-
ual has had a tremendous influence on the development of the law of 
armed conflict at sea. For example, the approach of the Manual on the issue 
of exclusion zones is now reflected in the military manuals of a number of 
States.202 
 
A. The San Remo Manual 
 
One of the important contributions of the San Remo Manual to the issue of 
exclusion zones is the way in which it separates out the establishment of 
the zone from the measures that could be taken within it. As discussed 
above, during the second phase of exclusion zones, the very concept of an 
exclusion zone was closely linked to the measures that could be taken with-
in it. By contrast, the San Remo Manual provides that “[a] belligerent cannot 
be absolved of its duties under international humanitarian law by establish-
ing zones which might adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas 
of the sea.”203 In one sentence, the Manual casts aside much of the prior 
practice of exclusion zones. The Manual also takes into account States’ crit-
icisms of the practice of exclusion zones in prior conflicts. As already not-
ed, this sometimes concerned the targeting of vessels within an exclusion 
zone rather than the creation of the zone itself.  
The commentary to the relevant provision of the San Remo Manual re-
veals that “[s]ome participants . . . argued that State practice supported the 
                                                                                                                      
200. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6. 
201. Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (accepted as setting out the sources of international law). The San 
Remo Manual does, however, reflect customary international law in certain respects. 
202. See Part IV.B. 
203. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 105. 
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view that belligerents could be absolved of their duties under international 
humanitarian law” in the zone, but that, “[a]fter an extended discussion . . . 
a consensus emerged that the establishment of zones did not and could not 
absolve belligerents from their duties or create new rights to attack ships or 
aircraft.”204 This is reinforced by the paragraph of the Manual that follows, 
which provides that, if a belligerent establishes an exclusion zone, “the 
same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone.”205 That para-
graph might be considered redundant in light of the fact that the previous 
one provides that the belligerent is required to comply with international 
humanitarian law. Nonetheless, given the practice of the exclusion zones 
that pre-dated the Manual, it serves to confirm the importance of the point. 
Unfortunately, the clarity of the two paragraphs is reduced by the text 
of the accompanying “explanation.” The explanation notes that: 
 
Bearing in mind the factual circumstances surrounding zone creation . . . 
parties might be more likely to do certain things in a zone than outside of 
a zone, particularly if the zone were created for defensive purposes. For 
example, if a party established a zone in accordance with the [listed] crite-
ria . . . it might be more likely to presume that ships or aircraft in the area 
without permission were there for hostile purposes than it would be if no 
zone had been established.206 
 
The import of this paragraph is unclear.207 The language used—“parties 
might be more likely” and “it might be more likely”—suggests that the 
drafters are not advocating the possibility; rather, they are describing what 
might happen in practice. However, the fact that the language is included in 
the explanation suggests that the drafters condone the possibility. This is 
unfortunate given that the Manual confirms that “the same body of law ap-
plies both inside and outside the zone” and outside the zone, a vessel could 
not be presumed to be hostile. In the law of land warfare, in case of doubt, 
certain objects are to be presumed to be civilian objects.208 The presump-
tion ought also to apply to armed conflicts at sea given that it is closely re-
lated to the principle of distinction, which is a principle of the law of armed 
                                                                                                                      
204. Id., ¶ 104. 
205. Id., ¶ 106(a). 
206. Id., ¶ 104. 
207. See Pocar, supra note 190, at 223 (describing the issue as a “grey area”). 
208. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 52(3), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 
 
 
Exclusion Zones in the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea Vol. 92 
 
194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conflict at sea.209 Rather, what an exclusion zone does is enable the State 
establishing the zone to ascertain more easily the character of a vessel by 
inter alia reducing the number of vessels that are likely to enter the zone.210 
The presence of a vessel within the exclusion zone might support an infer-
ence that the vessel is hostile, but should not amount to a presumption of hos-
tile status.211  
In any event, a presumption that a vessel is hostile cannot automatically 
lead to attack. It is incumbent on the party to the armed conflict to take all 
feasible precautions in attack, including doing “everything feasible to en-
sure that attacks are limited to military objectives.”212 Accordingly, the entry 
of a vessel into an exclusion zone, by itself, should not automatically lead 
to an attack. Instead, the vessel should be instructed to leave the zone, or 
“subjected to extensive control measures.”213 
The second important contribution of the San Remo Manual to this area 
of the law follows on from the separation of the creation of the zone from 
the measures that may be taken within it. Given that the same body of law 
applies within the zone as outside it, the law of armed conflict at sea does 
not prohibit exclusion zones. At the same time, it does not expressly per-
mit them. There is no rule of conventional law that authorizes the practice 
and State practice and opinio juris do not yet point to a customary authoriza-
tion.214 There are very few possible occasions on which the San Remo type 
of exclusion zone has been used in practice,215 but a number of military 
manuals do refer to it. Thus, the practice seems to be moving in the direc-
tion of a customary authorization. Accordingly, the San Remo Manual does 
not comment on the inherent legality or illegality of exclusion zones but 
                                                                                                                      
209. See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 110, at 481, 522.  
210. See Gert-Jan van Hegelsom, Methods and Means of Combat in Naval Warfare, in 
METHODS AND MEANS OF COMBAT IN NAVAL WARFARE 1, 52 (Wolff Heintschel von 
Heinegg ed., 1992). 
211. Cf. Christopher Greenwood, Commentary, in METHODS AND MEANS OF COMBAT 
IN NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 202, at 210. 
212. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 46(b). 
213. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 110, at 530.  
214. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Maritime Warfare, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 145, 168 (Andrew Clapham & Paola 
Gaeta eds., 2014) (noting that “it is not absolutely clear whether and to what extent so-
called exclusion zones are in accordance with the law of naval warfare”). But in another 
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recognized method under customary international law.” Heintschel von Heinegg, supra 
note 110, at 522. 
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regulates the zones in the event that belligerents decide to create them.216 
Each zone thus needs to be judged on its own terms. 
In order for a particular exclusion zone to be lawful, it must take ac-
count of the rules of the law of the sea. Two rules that are of particular im-
portance for present purposes are the reservation of the high seas for 
peaceful purposes and the freedom of the high seas. 
Article 88 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) provides that “[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful 
purposes.”217 At first sight, that provision might be considered to render 
unlawful the conduct of hostilities on the high seas. However, it can hardly 
be imagined that States, including the major naval powers, agreed to pro-
hibit armed conflict on the high seas, let alone through such an ambiguous 
provision.218 Rather, the scope of the provision can be determined by refer-
ence to another provision of UNCLOS, namely Article 301.219 That Article 
is entitled “[p]eaceful uses of the seas” and provides that, “[i]n exercising 
their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Par-
ties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of 
the United Nations.”220 Accordingly, Article 88 does not prohibit armed 
conflict on the high seas in general.221  
                                                                                                                      
216. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 106. 
217. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 88. Other provisions of UNCLOS also reference 
peaceful purposes or uses. See, e.g., id., arts. 141, 240, 301 (discussing specific uses of the 
oceans for peaceful purposes). 
218. See Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention 
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(1984); Adam Boleslaw Boczek, Peaceful Purposes Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 20 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW 359 (1989). 
219. See U.N. Secretary General, The Naval Arms Race, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/40/535 
(Sept. 17, 1985); Douglas Guilfoyle, The High Seas, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
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220. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 301. 
221. See Message from the President of the United States transmitting United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, and the Agreement Relating to the Im-
plementation of Part XI of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 
1982, S. TREATY DOC. 103-39 (1994), reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 
1396, 1446. 
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The second rule of particular importance is the freedom of the high 
seas. This can be found in a number of treaties and reflects long-standing 
customary international law.222 The freedom of the high seas includes inter 
alia freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and freedom of fish-
ing.223 The freedom of the high seas is “exercised under the conditions laid 
down by this Convention [UNCLOS] and by other rules of international 
law.”224 The reference to “other rules of international law” includes the 
rules in the law of armed conflict at sea and would thus include, for exam-
ple, blockades and associated measures, such as visit, search, and diversion. 
It also “leaves the door open to consider the exclusion zones as legiti-
mate.”225  
Pursuant to UNCLOS, the freedom of the high seas must be exercised 
“with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise” of that 
freedom.226 Accordingly, the freedom of the high seas for neutral States 
must be exercised with due regard for the freedom of belligerents to carry 
out their operations on the high seas and vice versa. Contrary to some sug-
gestions, it is not the case that “whenever military activities come into con-
flict with peaceful uses, the former must yield to the latter.”227 Equally, the 
law of the sea is not overridden by the law of armed conflict at sea. In time 
of armed conflict at sea, the law of the sea does not fall way, but continues 
to apply. There is a horizontal relationship between the law of the sea and 
the law of armed conflict at sea rather than a vertical one. In general terms, 
the freedom of the high seas for neutrals does not take precedence over the 
same freedom for belligerents; likewise, the freedom of belligerents does 
not take precedence over the freedom for neutrals. Rather, the freedom of 
the high seas must be read together with the law of armed conflict at sea; and 
the law of armed conflict at sea must take into account the importance of 
the freedom of the high seas for neutral States.228 This has to be considered 
                                                                                                                      
222. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87; Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, 
art. 2.  
223. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87(1). 
224. Id. 
225. Pocar, supra note 190, at 221. See also Michaelsen, supra note 1, at 374. 
226. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87(2). 
227. Francesco Francioni, Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of the 
Sea, 18 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 203, 225 (1985). 
228. For example, the SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 12, provides that, “[i]n 
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at the level of a particular norm at not at the level of a body of law (law of 
the sea versus law of armed conflict at sea). 
In finding the proper balance, the “due regard” principle applies. As 
one author notes: “[t]he principle underlying this rule is that the exercise of 
one freedom is the limit to the exercise of the others. No preferences are 
given and the coexistence of the various activities has to be sought through 
the necessary accommodations.”229 Thus, insofar as exclusion zones are 
concerned, the legality of a particular exclusion zone will depend on the 
specificities of that zone, in particular, how it balances the freedom of the 
high seas for neutrals with that same freedom for belligerents. The precise 
location of the zone will therefore be critical, for example, the extent to 
which it interferes with shipping lanes and fishing areas. So too will the 
measures taken by the belligerents, for example, providing alternate ship-
ping routes or escorting vessels through the zone, and the extent to which 
these routes depart in terms of length and duration from the usual shipping 
routes.230  
In describing the regulation of exclusion zones should they be created, 
the San Remo Manual provides for this very balance. It provides that: 
 
(b) the extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures im-
posed shall not exceed what is strictly required by military necessity and 
the principle of proportionality; 
(c) due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral States to legitimate 
uses of the seas; 
(d) necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and air-
craft shall be provided: 
(i) where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes 
free and safe access to the ports and coasts of a neutral State; 
(ii) in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except 
where military requirements do not permit; and 
(e) the commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well 
as the restrictions imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately 
notified.231 
                                                                                                                      
229. Tullio Treves, High Seas, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, ¶ 31 (2009), 
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ZONES 4-22–4-23 (2015). 
231. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 107. 
 
 
 
Exclusion Zones in the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea Vol. 92 
 
198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although framed as “progressive development of the law,” the San Remo 
text quoted above constitutes sensible guidance for interpreting the rights 
of neutrals to the freedom of the high seas together with the rights of bel-
ligerents in that same area. As the San Remo Manual goes on to note, 
“[z]ones located in isolated areas far from normal shipping routes . . . are 
less likely to raise objections than zones on major shipping routes . . . 
Zones occupying relatively small areas or established for relatively brief 
periods are more likely than the converse to be considered acceptable.”232 
The same guidance readily explains why defensive zones of limited area 
and adjacent to the coast, such as that created by Japan prior to the Russo-
Japanese War, are more easily accepted. 
 
B. Beyond the San Remo Manual 
 
The two contributions of the San Remo Manual discussed above demon-
strate the importance of that Manual to the conceptualization of exclusion 
zones. However, the Manual would have only a limited effect were it not 
accepted by States. Accordingly, the reaction of States to the Manual is cru-
cial in determining the extent to which the change in approach reflects a 
change in the law and practice of exclusion zones. 
The reaction of States is revealing. A number of States have incorpo-
rated the approach taken in the San Remo Manual into their own military 
manuals and associated publications.233 The U.S. Navy’s Annotated Supple-
ment to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations is the clearest 
example of the impact of the San Remo Manual in this regard. The 1989 ver-
sion of the Annotated Supplement considers “war zones” in a footnote, con-
trasting them to the immediate area of naval operations. It provides: 
 
Operational or war zones refer to areas of the high seas, of widely varying 
extent which, for substantial periods of time, are barred altogether to neu-
                                                                                                                      
232. Id., ¶ 106.2. See also Fenrick, supra note 30, at 125. On the influence of Fenrick’s 
article on the San Remo Manual, see van Hegelsom, supra note 210, at 51. 
233. The approach of the San Remo Manual also “inspired” Principle 3.3 of the Inter-
national Law Association’s Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality. See 
Committee on Maritime Neutrality, International Law Association, Helsinki Principles on the 
Law of Maritime Neutrality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 68TH 
CONFERENCE, TAIPEI, 1998, at 505 (1998), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: 
A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 1425 (Die-
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tral shipping or within which belligerents claim the right to exercise a de-
gree of control over neutral vessels not otherwise permitted by the rules 
of naval warfare. In practice, belligerents have based the establishment of 
operational or war zones on the right of reprisal against alleged illegal be-
havior of an enemy.234 
 
This reflects the understanding of an exclusion zone prior to the San Remo 
Manual, which was discussed in Part III, and which saw measures being 
taken within the zone that could not be taken outside it. Furthermore, the 
Annotated Supplement confirmed that zones were established as an excep-
tional measure. 
By contrast, the 1997 iteration of the Annotated Supplement, which was 
published just a few years after the San Remo Manual, took an altogether 
different view. It devoted a short section to “exclusion zones and war 
zones” and distinguished between the concept of an exclusion zone prac-
ticed during the world wars and the San Remo concept of an exclusion 
zone. The 1997 iteration of the Annotated Supplement provided: 
 
To the extent that such zones serve to warn neutral vessels and aircraft 
away from belligerent activities and thereby reduce their exposure to col-
lateral damage and incidental injury . . . and to the extent that they do not 
unreasonably interfere with legitimate neutral commerce, they are un-
doubtedly lawful. However, the establishment of such a zone does not re-
lieve the proclaiming belligerent of the obligation under the law of armed 
conflict to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft which do not consti-
tute lawful targets. In short, an otherwise protected platform does not 
lose that protection by crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a 
belligerent.235 
 
The approach of the San Remo Manual is thus reflected in the 1997 Supple-
ment. The creation of the zone is separated from the measures that may be 
taken within it and the Supplement confirms that a vessel’s protection does 
not suddenly change once it crosses the “imaginary line” that constitutes 
the boundary of the zone. Indeed, the Supplement cites the San Remo Manual 
                                                                                                                      
234. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 7-39 n.141 (1989), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a221855.pdf. 
235. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 7.9 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, 
U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (internal citations omitted). 
 
 
 
Exclusion Zones in the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea Vol. 92 
 
200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for that proposition. The Supplement goes on to note that, in certain circum-
stances, exclusion zones are deemed “undoubtedly lawful.”236 The same 
passage is repeated in the 2007 Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations.237 
The influence of the San Remo Manual is most evident in the Supplement 
due to the two editions being published shortly before and shortly after the 
San Remo Manual, but its influence extends to other manuals. For example, 
the German Commander’s Handbook notes that exclusion zones must not “be 
confused with . . . the exclusion areas of the world wars”, that they are 
“admissible only in exceptional cases,” and that “[a] vehicle that must not 
be attacked, i.e. especially neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft, will 
never lose this protection for the sole reason that they have entered an ex-
clusion zone without authorization.”238 The Australian Manual is to similar 
effect, noting that “[t]here is no specific international law treaty provision 
referring to [Maritime Exclusion Zones (MEZ)], however, their use has 
acquired a degree of validity under customary international law” and that 
“[t]he establishment of an MEZ does not relieve the belligerent of its du-
ties under IHL.”239 The Canadian Manual takes much the same approach.240 
Likewise, the UK Manual provides that exclusion zones “are legitimate 
means of exercising the right of self-defence and other rights enjoyed un-
der international law” and that the same body of law applies within the 
zone as it does outside.241 For its part, the U.S. Department of Defense 
Law of War Manual, in the context of the “Use of Zones to Warn Vessels or 
                                                                                                                      
236. Id. 
237. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-
12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS ¶ 7.9 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK].  
238. GERMAN NAVY, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK: LEGAL BASES FOR THE OPERA-
TIONS OF NAVAL FORCES ¶ 304 (2002). See also FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (GER-
MANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL ¶¶ 1055–56 (2013); Louise Dos-
wald-Beck, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 35 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 583 (1995) (noting that the San Remo Manual 
“influenced the provisions relating to naval warfare in the German manual,” but not speci-
fying which provisions were so influenced). 
239. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, ADDP 06.4, LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT ¶¶ 6.33–6.34 (2006) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN MANUAL]. 
240. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶¶ 852–53 (2001) 
[hereinafter CANADIAN MANUAL]. 
241. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 13.77.1, 13.78 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]. 
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Aircraft—War, Operational, Warning, and Safety Zones,” provides that 
“[t]he establishment of such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming bellig-
erent State of its obligation under the law of war to refrain from attacking 
vessels and aircraft that do not constitute military objectives” and that “a 
vessel or aircraft that is otherwise protected does not forfeit its protection 
from being made the object of attack simply by entering a zone of the 
ocean on the high seas established by a belligerent State.”242 Indeed, by 
2015, a U.S. Naval War College manual on maritime operational zones 
could observe that “all legal texts universally state that such a belligerent 
operational zone is not a free fire zone” and that “[t]his remains an un-
doubted and immutable legal proposition.”243 This stands in complete con-
trast to the practice of exclusion zones in the second phase of exclusion 
zones discussed in Part III.  
The Australian, Canadian, German and UK manuals also set out regu-
lations for the zones, should they be established, that are contained in the 
San Remo Manual, sometimes word for word;244 while the Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the U.S. Department of De-
fense Law Of War Manual reflect some, but not all, of the restrictions.245 
The San Remo Manual has thus had an important effect on State military 
manuals and associated publications, all the more notable for the San Remo 
Manual’s status as a writing of a publicist.246 
Since the publication of the San Remo Manual, few zones have been es-
tablished and it is unclear whether those that have constitute exclusion 
zones.247 Thus, the San Remo Manual’s position on exclusion zones is yet to 
                                                                                                                      
242. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 13.9.2 (2015) [herein-
after DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
243. MARITIME OPERATIONAL ZONES, supra note 230, at 4-8. 
244. GERMAN NAVY, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 238, ¶ 305; AUSTRALI-
AN MANUAL, supra note 239, ¶ 6.34; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 240, ¶ 853; UK 
MANUAL, supra note 241, ¶ 13.78; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 106. 
245. U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 237, at 7-12; DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 242, ¶ 13.9.4. 
246. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 201, art. 38(1)(d). 
247. As part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, on March 20, 2003, upon the commence-
ment of the armed conflict, the United States provided notification of the creation of a 
‘Maritime Safety Zone’ in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Vessels were advised to exercise 
caution and stay away from the zone. Freedom of navigation was thus curtailed. The noti-
fication provided that “VESSELS THAT ENTER THE MARITIME SAFETY ZONE 
WHICH ARE APPROACHING U.S. FORCES, OR VESSELS WHOSE INTEN-
TIONS ARE UNCLEAR ARE SUBJECT TO BOARDING AND VISIT BY U.S. 
FORCES.” HYDROLANT 597/03 (54, 56), March 20, 2003, reproduced in MARITIME 
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be tested fully. However, it is has had a considerable effect on States’ views 
on the matter, as reflected in their military manuals. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The notion of an exclusion zone in the law of armed conflict at sea has un-
dergone considerable change. When used in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904–5, the exclusion zone was defensive in character and located adjacent 
to the State that authorized it. By contrast, the next iteration of the exclu-
sion zone saw it transformed into something rather different.  
During the First World War, the exclusion zone served to trigger a dif-
ference in the level of protection. If a vessel was within an exclusion zone, 
it was deemed susceptible to attack, regardless of whether it was a neutral 
or belligerent one. This understanding of an exclusion zone continued dur-
ing subsequent wars and armed conflicts.  
The third (and present) iteration of exclusion zones can be traced back 
to the San Remo Manual. The San Remo Manual process triggered a transfor-
mation in the law and practice of exclusion zones. In particular, the San 
Remo Manual distinguished between the establishment of an exclusion zone 
and the enforcement of the zone. It clarified that the same law applies 
within an exclusion zone as it does outside it and set out regulations for the 
zone should one be created. Thus, Heintschel von Heinegg notes that “[n]o 
zone, whatever its denomination or alleged purpose, does relieve the pro-
claiming belligerent of the obligation under the law of naval warfare to re-
frain from attacking vessels and aircraft which do not constitute legitimate 
military objectives.”248  
State military manuals that have been published after the San Remo 
Manual take the same approach as the San Remo Manual. They, too, separate 
out the establishment of an exclusion zone from its enforcement. They also 
reproduce, sometimes word for word, the regulations for exclusion zones 
should they be created. Given that before the San Remo Manual, the concept 
                                                                                                                      
OPERATIONAL ZONES, supra note 230, at C-60. It further requested that vessels that were 
approaching US forces maintain radio contact; and provided that appropriate measures 
may be taken in self-defence if circumstances warrant.If the zone amounted to an exclu-
sion zone, by contrast to the previous incarnation of the exclusion zone, it did not amount 
to a free-fire zone. Rather, the notification made clear that vessels entering the zone would 
be subject to visit. However, the zone might better be considered some sort of warning 
zone for protection of the naval units, akin to the immediate area of naval operations. 
248. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 173, at 163. 
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of an exclusion zones was considered inextricably linked with the measures 
that could be taken within it, and which departed from the level of protec-
tion that would be afforded outside the zone, the San Remo Manual has had 
a profound influence on this area of the law. Indeed, contrary to the earlier 
practice of exclusion zones, which were justified as exceptional measures, 
in the view of some States, certain exclusion zones are now considered to 
be authorized under customary international law. 
 
 
 
